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Occupied Crimea:
Europe’s grey zone
Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in March 
2014. The first forcible annexation of part of a European 
country since 1945, it has had a significant impact on 
Crimea and the Black Sea region more broadly. Crimea’s 
economy has nose-dived under international sanctions. 
Human rights are in free-fall. Critics of the occupying 
authorities face harassment and incarceration.
By militarising Crimea, Russia has reinforced its position 
in the Black and Azov seas. It threatens both Ukraine’s 
security and NATO’s freedom to move within the 
region. Russian efforts to block the Kerch Strait are de 
facto imposing a sea blockade on Ukraine’s freedom of 
navigation and commerce in the Sea of Azov.
While parallel crises may have drawn attention away 
from Crimea, the worsening of the security and human 
rights situation in and around the peninsula calls for 
a response. The European Union (EU) must uphold its 
refusal to recognise Crimea’s annexation. It should 
adamantly enforce the sanctions and expand them 
to include human rights violations. Strengthening 
measures to counterbalance Russia in the Black Sea 
should also be a priority for both the EU and NATO.
BACKGROUND – A BRAZEN LAND GRAB
Crimea’s annexation was swift and without bloodshed, 
taking just over three weeks. On 27 February 2014, a 
group of unidentified “little green” men seized the 
local parliament and government buildings. It was 
the beginning of a hybrid operation that involved 
both covert and overt activities, supported by a 
disinformation campaign.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that 
Ukraine’s pro-Western revolution threatened ethnic 
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Russians in Crimea. While Ukraine’s governance in 
Crimea was deficient, it was little different from many 
other Ukrainian regions. There was never an oppressive 
policy toward Russian speakers. Moreover, in 2014, 
there was no mobilisation for reunification with Russia 
or regional independence.1 Moscow took advantage of 
political turmoil in Kyiv to stoke tensions and spread 
disinformation.
At a hastily organised referendum on 16 March 2014, 
96% of voters backed joining Russia with a reported 
83.1% turnout. While the international community and 
the EU declared the vote illegal and invalid, on 21 March, 
the Russian parliament approved the annexation. In 
doing so, Russia broke several international agreements, 
including the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. 
The Kremlin also overturned the pledge it had made 
in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 to “respect the 
independence and sovereignty and existing borders of 
Ukraine” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force”.
Few in the West had expected such a brazen move. A 
lesson Russia had taken from its 2008 war with Georgia 
was that the West was unenthusiastic about countering 
Russian military action in the neighbourhood. The fact 
that Moscow paid no price for its aggression in Georgia 
probably boosted its confidence in invading Ukraine.
With Crimea, the reaction was more robust. While 
military action was never on the cards, the West, 
including the EU, was quick in imposing sanctions. On 
17 March 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted 
sanctions against 21 officials and associated persons and 
1 https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/15/revisiting-2014-annexation-of-
crimea-pub-68423
entities involved in actions threatening the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.2 
Sanctions have been renewed and broadened over the 
past four years, most recently in July 2018. Besides a few 
exceptions (Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, 
Syria and Venezuela), the world has not recognised 
Crimea as a part of Russia.
STATE OF PLAY – A GREY ZONE
The annexation has had profound economic, 
humanitarian and security consequences for Crimea, and 
carries broader implications for stability in the Black Sea.
Economic depression
Despite Putin’s promises, there has been no economic 
miracle. Following the sanctions, international investors 
have fled, and Crimea has become increasingly dependent 
on financial aid from Moscow, so far receiving over 
USD 7.5 billion.3 Key assets have been stolen. Over 500 
properties and enterprises owned by the Ukrainian state 
and private businesses, as well as some 18 onshore and 
offshore hydrocarbon fields, have been seized.4
Only a few privileged individuals, including state 
bureaucrats, military and law enforcement officials, have 
seen their quality of life improve. While Russia increased 
salaries and pensions, the rise in food and utility 
prices, resulting from the cost of transporting goods 
from Russia and the Rouble’s depreciation, has left the 
majority of people struggling to survive. According to a 
ZOiS public survey, just 26.5% of the people in Crimea 
“have enough money, but only for the most necessary 
things”. Only 1% said that “they can afford anything 
they want”.5
Tourism and agriculture, previously the engines of 
the Crimean economy, have been devastated. A severe 
water crisis has further exacerbated the situation of 
the farming sector. Before annexation, 86% of Crimea’s 
freshwater came from Ukraine via the Dnieper-Crimea 
canal. The Ukrainian authorities cut it off in April 2014.
The newly constructed Kerch Bridge connecting 
Russia to Crimea may help reduce prices, by cutting 
transportation costs, but it is unlikely to bring about 
any significant improvement in living conditions. 
Instead, the bridge allows Moscow to expand its control 
of the Sea of Azov, which jeopardises the commercial 
attractiveness of the large Ukrainian ports of Mariupol 
and Berdyansk.6 The bridge’s low height prevents large 
vessels above 33-metres tall from passing. Furthermore, 
patrols of Russia’s Federal Security Service are stopping 
both Ukrainian and international cargo vessels trading 
with the Ukrainian ports. They search the ships for 
hours, causing thousands of Euros in losses for shipping 
companies. The situation in the Sea of Azov thus risks 
becoming a new regional flashpoint. On 5 September, 
the EU issued a statement calling on Russia to ensure 
unhindered access to Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. 
It was ignored.
Since annexation, human rights have been 
in free-fall. Residents who voice dissent 
or try to exercise their fundamental rights 
are subject to harsh repression. Ethnic 
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars face the 
greatest persecution.
 
A human rights black hole
Since annexation, human rights have been in free-fall. 
Residents who voice dissent or try to exercise their 
fundamental rights are subject to harsh repression. 
Ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars face the  
greatest persecution.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR) accuses Russian authorities of numerous 
human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests 
and torture.7 Ukrainian film director Oleg Sentsov is an 
example. A vocal critic of annexation, he was arrested in 
May 2014 and sentenced to 20 years in prison, following 
an unfair trial on politically-motivated terrorism charges. 
Since 14 May 2018, he has been on a hunger strike.
Crimean Tatars are victims of intimidation, intrusive and 
unlawful searches of their homes, physical attacks, and 
disappearances.8 Thousands of Tatars have been arrested 
and taken into custody based on bogus terrorist-related 
charges. In 2014, their representative body, the Mejlis, 
was seized. Banned as an extremist group, it relocated to 
Kyiv. Its incumbent chairman, Refat Chubarov, and Tatar 
leader Mustafa Dzhemilev were expelled from Crimea, 
along with other Mejlis members and supporters from 
local organisations.
Journalists are also systemically harassed. Russia 
has created an information ghetto by cutting 
telecommunications links between Crimea and mainland 
Ukraine; silencing critical media and making Internet 
service providers operate under Russia’s repressive 
media laws. Bloggers have become the primary source of 
objective information. They frequently face persecution.
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2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/17/
3 https://themoscowtimes.com/news/crimea-asks-moscow-financial-aid-hail-
drought-costs-62100 
4 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/seizing-assets-in-crimea-
from-shipyard-to-film-studio.html & https://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/
comments/4747-statement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-ukraine-
with-regard-to-gross-violation-by-the-russian-federation-of-the-united-
nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea
5 https://www.zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_
Report_3_2017.pdf
6 http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=24734
7 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=22140
8 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/14/crimea-persecution-crimean-tatars-
intensifies
Freedom of religion is under attack too. Religious 
organisations had to reregister post-annexation under 
Russian law.9 The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection 
Group reports that while there were over 2000 registered 
organisations in 2013, by September 2017, there were only 
818. Mosques associated with the Crimean Tatars were 
denied permission to register. The Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church-Kyiv Patriarchate refused to reregister. In what 
appears as a strategy to eradicate all links to Ukraine, the 
Church is being pushed to the brink of oblivion.
The ‘russification’ of Crimea had intensified. Prior to 
annexation Crimea has a population of some 2 million: 
60% ethnic Russian, 25% ethnic Ukrainian, 12% ethnic 
Tatar. Following annexation, thousands of Ukrainian 
citizens automatically became Russian citizens 
whether they wanted to or not. All schools offering a 
full Ukrainian curriculum were closed. The number of 
students receiving their education in Ukrainian has 
plummeted from 13,589 to 371. Some 247,000 Russians 
have reportedly moved to Crimea since the annexation, 
while at least 140,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and 
Tatars, have left.10 Forcibly shifting the demographic 
composition of an occupied territory is a war crime 
under the Geneva Convention.
Since 2014, Russia has progressively 
militarised Crimea. The Kerch Bridge 
further strengthened Russia’s grip 
by expediting the transfer of military 
equipment and personnel to Crimea. 
Russia uses the Black Sea as a springboard 
to project power into the Middle East, the 
Balkans, and the Mediterranean.
Militarisation of the peninsula
Since 2014, Russia has progressively militarised Crimea. 
The Kerch Bridge further strengthened Russia’s grip 
by expediting the transfer of military equipment and 
personnel to Crimea. Russia uses the Black Sea as a 
springboard to project power into the Middle East, the 
Balkans, and the Mediterranean.
Russia has expanded its military infrastructure and 
troop presence, now estimated at some 32,000. Moscow 
has upgraded its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Russia 
has moved naval vessels including warships from its 
Caspian Flotilla to the Sea of Azov.11 New ships and 
submarines can fire Kalibr and anti-ship cruise missiles. 
The fleet has also received an array of new aircraft.
Russia is also setting up a medium-range surface-to-air 
missile system. Two-battalions of S-400 long-range air 
defence systems have been deployed, in addition to the 
existing S-300 long-range and Pantsir-S medium-range 
surface-to-air missiles. Russia has also enhanced coastal 
defences with S-400, and Bastion and Bal coastal defence 
missiles.12 They allow Russia to establish an anti-access 
or area-denial zone (A2/AD) covering most of the 
Black Sea, the aim being to limit NATO’s ability to act. 
Provocative acts such as large-scale military exercises, 
air manoeuvring and cyber-attacks are happening on a 
regular occurrence.
The EU’s response
The EU has repeatedly condemned Russia’s actions 
in Crimea, upholding a non-recognition policy and 
maintaining sanctions. Asset freezes and visa bans 
have been applied to 155 persons and 44 entities. On 
31 July 2018, the EU imposed sanctions against six 
more Russian organisations for being involved in the 
construction of the Kerch Bridge.
Measures also include an import ban on goods from 
Crimea and Sevastopol, an export ban on certain 
products and technologies, the prohibition of EU-
based foreign direct investments and the prohibition of 
tourism services such as European cruise ships docking 
at Crimean ports.13 However, there are weak spots in 
the sanctions regime, and tighter implementation 
is required.14 Vessels from several EU member states 
(e.g. Greece, Bulgaria and Romania) have infringed 
the sanctions by docking in Crimean ports. Other 
Western companies have also been accused of trying 
to circumvent the sanctions regime including Siemens 
some Dutch companies.
Sectoral sanctions (including those related to Russian 
aggression in the Donbas) have proven painful for Russia, 
aggravating an economic downturn triggered by falling 
oil prices, from which the country has only just begun 
to recover.15 However, Moscow’s policy has remained 
unchanged. Strategic objectives have proven more 
important than economic costs. Russian adventurism 
remains in full swing. The attempted murder of former 
Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter on 4 March 
2018, which two Russian intelligence officials are accused 
of, was a particularly brazen act. Russia has calculated 
that sanctions represent the strongest response the West 
can collectively agree on and has so far decided that they 
are survivable.
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9 Ibid.
10 https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-accused-of-reshaping-annexed-crimea-
demographics-ukraine/29262130.html
11 https://eurasianet.org/russia-transfers-five-warships-out-of-caspian-sea
12 https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/is-a-new-russian-black-sea-fleet-
coming-or-is-it-her
13 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/18/
illegal-annexation-of-crimea-and-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-by-one-
year/
14 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/us-and-eu-need-to-take-
on-crimea-sanction-sneaks
15 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.
html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)614665
The Kremlin is playing for time, in the expectation that 
EU unity will eventually collapse. While some political 
leaders, including from Bulgaria, Italy, and Greece, 
have called for sanctions to be lifted, their views have 
not resonated in official decision-making. For member 
states, the political cost of challenging EU unity on a 
highly visible matter outweighs the economic benefits 
of increased trade with Russia. The EU has also avoided 
falling into the trap of trading Crimea for imaginary 
concessions from Russia in other areas, including in the 
Donbas and Syria. Striking such a deal would undermine 
the bedrock of the international order, namely the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.
PROSPECTS – EXPANDING THE SANCTIONS 
REGIME
As the world’s attention has been shifting to other 
crises, Russia has tightened its grip on Crimea. It is 
becoming a fortress where opponents to Russian rule 
either have to flee or are bullied into silence.
The return of Crimea to Ukraine seems impossible 
for the foreseeable future. There is currently no 
framework to discuss the future of the peninsula, and 
there is unlikely to be one before the end of Putin’s 
rule. When asked whether Russia would ever make 
concessions regarding Crimea, Putin replied that 
“there are no such circumstances and there never will 
be”.16 Whether this could change in a post-Putin era 
remains to be seen. Support for Russia also remains 
high in Crimea. In a recent ZOiS survey, 78% of those 
polled said they supported Moscow’s rule. Given the 
high level of disinformation, the lack of independent 
media and the growing isolation of Crimea, such a 
result is not surprising.
Sanctions have done little to change the situation, 
which makes it more difficult to maintain interest in 
Crimea among international stakeholders. However, 
accepting that annexation is irreversible would send 
the wrong message. Crimea’s occupation is not merely 
about Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It is also about 
the future and the legitimacy of the European security 
order as well as European values that cannot be 
forgotten or abdicated.
Crimea needs to remain on the international agenda. 
Those Crimeans that strongly opposed Russian 
annexation must feel that their cause is not lost, 
particularly regarding human rights. The EU should 
remain steadfast in its approach and adamant in 
enforcing sanctions. In particular, the EU should:
1 q introduce a rapid response mechanism for sanctions 
breaches to ensure that companies circumventing 
sanctions face the consequences and address any 
loop-holes in the sanctions regime;
2 q introduce individual sanctions against those 
responsible for violations of human rights as 
recommended in the European Parliament’s 5 October 
2017 resolution. The EU has already done so in other 
countries, such as Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Iran;
3 q insist that international monitors be granted 
unobstructed access to the peninsula to address the 
human rights situation in Crimea urgently;
4 q support legal claims for compensation against the 
theft and illegal exploitation of Ukrainian economic 
assets including off-shore hydrocarbons in Crimea;
5 q contend Russian disinformation by increasing its 
support to independent media or NGOs broadcasting 
to Crimea;
6 q insist that Russia stops restricting the freedom of 
navigation in the Azov Sea;
7 q continue to raise the Crimean issue with President 
Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov to avoid giving 
the impression that the annexation is a fait accompli, 
which is what Russia wants.
More broadly, counterbalancing Russia in the Black and 
Azov seas remains crucial. NATO should invest more 
in situational awareness, including by boosting air and 
sea patrol missions and increasing the rotation of naval 
ships in the Black Sea (within the limits of the Montreux 
Convention). NATO should also give priority to the 
implementation of the decisions of its 2016 and 2018 
summits and the strengthening of the alliance’s Black 
Sea presence.
The EU’s sanctions and non-recognition policy 
translates its commitment to international law. 
Sanctions must stay in place until Russia fully restores 
Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea. The price Russia 
has paid for occupying Crimea has been small. Russia 
should not be granted legitimacy in Ukraine as long as it 
remains in flagrant breach of international law.
The views expressed in this Policy Brief are the sole 
responsibility of the authors.
16 https://tass.ru/politika/5020759
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